A BREAKTHROUGH IN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A
BREAKTHROUGH IN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
file name: AA-BREAKTHROUGH
Governmental funding for abortion
and contraception is unconstitutional which will be proven here as a matter of
law. Yet to the contrary until now doing so is allegedly legitimized under
prior holdings by the U.S. Supreme Court. Consequently, I need to petition the
U.S. Supreme Court to grant me an oral argument pro se in order to answer the
following 2 questions:
1.
Whether my definition thereof here below upholds, whereas
the Restoration of Freedom of Religion Act [hereinafter known as RFRA’, added]
denies, religious freedom because my definition is,
but RFRA allegedly is, based on Sherbert v. Verner [374 US 398 (1963)].
2.
Whether any government official, elected or appointed,
federal or state, who consented to fund with taxes abortion and/or
contraception, the coverage thereof in group health insurance [“GHI”], Planned
Parenthood and/or constructively the tax-exempt and/or tax-deductible status1 thereof must be removed ab initio from office for violating the federal First Amendment
based on its words, “Congress shall pass no law … prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion, added].”
“(3)”
hidden4 even though the purpose for RFRA is “to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert”
[at 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)5] which applies only to burden “(3)”, the
yielding to which causes no sin6 whereas doing so to burdens (1)
and/or (2) does! And at exhibit A1 [i.e. 101 S.Ct. at 1431] the High Court in Thomas declared: “It is true that, as in
Sherbert, the Indiana law does not compel a violation of conscience” Id. which is consistent to my
explanation above!
Mr.
President, you’ll be proud presenting my litigation now ripe for judicial
review not only for your defense, but by doing so will be the most important
achievement of your legacy because as a result of your doing so will also cause
an increase in, and a wave throughout the world pro-moting, religious freedom;
against the war on the Unborn as well! Also, all pro-abortionists must leave
Congress thus effectively supplying money saved by doing so to build your
border wall!
A BURDEN ON THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION © 2004 Lawrence R. Rosano
A burden on the free exercise of
religion under the federal first amendment to the United States Constitution is
created when a religious adherent is coerced to consent to a proposed
temptation to violate religion in principle, only, in order to receive benefits
and/or be eligible for employment, both of which are not offensive to religion,
or else, be punished for not doing so by being denied the otherwise available
benefits and/or employment in question.
The intensity of this temptation is that much stronger when it is always
available, instead of proposed, as above, indicated, and, if always available,
consequently, the religious adherent is entitled the more to the religious
freedom in question, accordingly. However, in both cases, the religious freedom
is limited, only, by the government’s showing that the limitation or
restriction on religious freedom is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest. Nevertheless, to the contrary, the government
is prohibited from doing so, whenever the proposed temptation to as above
indicated. Cf. Rosano v. U.S., 9 Cl.Ct. 137, aff’d 800 F.2d 1226, cert. den. 480
US 907.
FALLACY IS THE WRENCH IN THE GEARS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SINCE 1963:
The U.S. Supreme Court planted this fallacy in Sherbert and 18 years later affirmed
that fallacy in Thomas v. Review Board [supra at 1431] at exhibit A1 in the 2nd
column that literally had upheld as follows: ‘The
ruling [disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert from benefits because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her
faith]’ which in plain language means this: Mrs. Sherbert was disqualified
from benefits because she refused to violate her religion in practice.
A. FIRED NOT FOR JUST CAUSE SHE’S OTHERWISE
ELIGIBLE, NOT “DISQUALIF[-IED]”
In context the “benefits” Id. above are Unemployment Compensation
Benefits [“UCB”’]. Fired from her job7 “because of her refusal to
work on Saturday in violation of her faith” Id.
1431 Mrs. Sherbert became otherwise eligible, not disqualified, to receive UCB,
pending her 2nd and final
consent to accept the state’s temptation upon her “to work on Saturday in
violation of her faith” Id. 1431 yet
in reality in principle only i.e. never in practice since the UCB board had
been unable to obligate her in the first place because it had already ruled her
“fired without just cause” thereby unavailable to do so in practice.
Conclusively the U.S. Supreme Court held “It is true that, as in Sherbert, the Indiana law does not compel a violation of conscience.” Id. 1431!
B. EXPOSED
UNDER THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA BY ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS
St. Thomas Aquinas in his The Summa Theologica at Qu. 17 Art. 3 Whether falsity is in the intellect?
teaches8 by “composing a
definition of parts which are mutually exclusive” “Everyone who is deceived,
understands not that in which he is deceived.” Cf. See Exhibits A3-5. In
1963 the US Supreme Court falsely held: Mrs. Sherbert was disqualified from UCB
as an UNEM-PLOYED applicant because she
refused to violate her religion in practice as an EMPLOYEE thereby defining “parts
which are mutually exclusive” Id.
Qu 17 Art 3. Whereas as a condition for - she was otherwise eligible, not disqualified, to receive - UCB for her
refusal to do so.
C. THE DOCTRINE OF NON-CONTRADICTION IN CONTEXT EXPLAINED
AT EXHIBIT A1
The underlined fallacy
between ‘1963’ & ‘A.’ above is also included in the top half of the 2nd
column [col] at exhibit A1 [i.e. page 1431 in Thomas v. Review Board, 101 S.Ct.] which is a pas- sage contrary to
the same in the bottom half of the same 2nd col on the same page
which is this:
“A similar argument was made and rejected in Sherbert, however. It is true [emphasis, added] that, as in Sherbert, the Indiana law does not compel
a violation of conscience [emphasis, added]. But ‘this is only the
beginning, not the end, of our inquiry.’ 374 U.S., at 403-404. In a variety of
ways we have said that ‘[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it burdens the
free exercise of religion [in principle only, added].”’ Id., 1431.
In sum at exhibit A1 under
the doctrine of non-contradiction in the upper half of the 2nd col
exposes this fallacy as opposed to the contrary in the lower half of the 2nd
col where the U.S. Supreme Court held, “It is true that, the .. law [d]oes not compel a violation of conscience" Id.!
D. EXPOSED
UNDER THE DOUBLE NEGATIVES’ RULE
EXPLAINED AT EXHIBIT A2
Applying the double negatives’ rule to this
fallacy above follows: Then, Mrs. Sherbert was qualified
for UCB because she worked on Saturday
violating her faith. But, on 2nd glance, since employed applicants
for, are disqualified to receive, UCB in turn this proves it’s a fallacy!”
Lawrence
R. Rosano
LRR1662@yahoo.com
A1
|
LEO:
Literacy Education Online
Double Negatives
|
“A double negative is
the nonstandard usage of two negatives used in the same sentence so that they
cancel each other and create a positive. In Shakespeare's day, double negatives
were considered emphatic, but today, they are considered grammar mistakes.
Remembering that two
negatives form a positive will help you to avoid the "double
negative" grammar problem:
Negative + Negative = Positive
Negative + Positive
= Negative
Negative Words
The following list
contains words that are regarded as negative. If you use them in your sentences
once, your statements will be negative.
no nobody not
no one none hardly nothing
scarcely neither barely nowhere
Using the rule
explained above in the box and the list of negative words given, study the
following examples:
|
|
Sentence
|
Meaning
|
|
Positive
Construction
negative + negative
|
I hardly
have none.
|
I have some.
|
|
I don't
want nothing.
|
I want something.
|
|
|
Negative
Construction
negative + positive
|
I hardly
have any.
|
I have few.
|
|
I don't
want anything.
|
I want nothing.
|
Note:
the usage of double negatives is not considered proper or standard in English.
On some occasions, mostly when speaking, the use of double negatives is
accepted; however, you must remember that the meaning of these expressions will always be
positive [emphasis, added].” A2
Tuesday, May 03, 2016 My Q & A Letter 1662 Lydia Avenue
Elmont, NY 11003
475 Law School 516-825-4949 home
The Catholic University of America
3600 John McCormack Rd., NE RE: The
Little Sisters of the Poor
Washington, D.C. 20064 Kindly review my legal reasoning
Phone: 202-319-5140 herein
as proof that I am entitled to give
E-mail: Rienzi@law.edu oral
argument in the USSC that will make The Little Sisters of the Poor victorious.
Dear Law Professor Mark
L. Rienzi, J.D.,
This letter
memorializes the Question and Answer Conversation [Q & A] we had both on Sept
13, ‘12 and Sept 18, ‘15 in Wash., D.C. Prior to our latter Q & A, you accepted
to hear and I presented legal reasoning why the Restoration of Freedom of
Religion Act - upon which you based all your legal arguments later raised
before the U.S. Supreme Court on March 23, 2016 - was a fallacy, yet only on
condition I had promised you not to have published again your emails to me, as I
had done in my Culture Wars Magazine May 2013 Letter to Editor [attached] where
I also memorialized my question to you, given during our former Q & A, at
the end of which I had called you, 2 other panelists there and all lawyers, “blind”,
which Q & A follows this one, below:
ROSANO: Professor Rienzi, would you say that
“disqualified from benefits” and “otherwise eligible for benefits” are the same
thing or are they opposed to each other?
LAW PROFESSOR RIENZI: Well, they’re opposed to each
other. Sure!
ROSANO: True or false. Mrs. Sherbert was fired from
her job because she refused to work on Saturday as an employee in violation of
her religion in practice as a Seventh Day Adventist.
LAW PROFESSOR RIENZI: O.K., that’s true for sure.
ROSANO: True or false. Mrs. Sherbert went to the
Unemployment Compensation Benefits [“UCB”] board now as an applicant for
employment to seek eligibility for UCB.
LAW PROFESSOR RIENZI: Yes, that’s true.
ROSANO: Next, the UCB board asked her this: “Why were
you fired?”
In response Mrs. Sherbert answered that it was because
she had refused to work on Saturday otherwise in violation of her religion in
practice. At first the board notified Mrs. Sherbert that she indeed had an
obligation to work every day of her employment. Yet Mrs. Sherbert informed the
UCB board that she was a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday
because to do otherwise would have been a violation of her religion in practice.
Beforehand, her employer had made an ultimatum during the week prior to firing
her saying, “If you don’t come in, as insubordinate, then you’ll be fired for not
working, on Saturday”. But the UCB board ruled that Mrs. Sherbert was indeed
“fired without just cause”. So now, Prof Rienzi, would you say that the
above is in reality the precise and accurate statement of facts and
circumstances described in Sherbert
above?
LAW PROFESSOR RIENZI: That seems about right! Sure.
A3
ROSANO: Next, Mrs. Sherbert was asked a second and
final question in order to receive UCB, which was this: “Mrs. Sherbert, are you
ready, willing and able to accept the possibility of working at any job even
though that job may include working on Saturday?” In turn, Mrs. Sherbert answered
unconditionally, “No”, and consequently was denied UCB. Conclusively then as a
matter of law the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Sherbert v. Verner by completely upholding Thomas v. Review Board which held the following:
“The ruling [disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert from benefits
because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her faith].” Id.
Prof Rienzi, do you agree with the Supreme Court who
upheld the above passage?
LAW PROFESSOR RIENZI: Yes, I do! Here, Mrs. Sherbert
was disqualified from UCB precisely because she refused to work on Saturday in
violation of her religion in practice. Therefore, I do agree with the Supreme
Court.
ROSANO: But, Prof Rienzi, wasn’t Mrs. Sherbert
“otherwise eligible for benefits” only “because of her refusal to work on
Saturday in violation of her faith”, Id.,
and then only because the UCB board had, first, ruled beforehand that she had
been “fired without just cause” and, secondly, given her the second and final
question in order to become eligible for UCB as indicated above?
LAW PROFESSOR RIENZI: Yes.
ROSANO: Now you stepped in it, Professor Rienzi!
Remember at the beginning of this, our 2-minute Q & A dialogue, when you
said this: “disqualified from benefits” and “otherwise eligible for benefits”
are opposed to each other?
MY REFLECTIONS #1
At that point you walked away speechless with a
disturbed look over your face. Cf.
John 8:32. By the way, Professor Rienzi, would you object if I had the above Q
& A published? If you do object, then, could you please be so kind to tell
me, why you would object? However, after all I realize and appreciate that you
granted me that 2-minute Q & A in the first place so thank you!
Yet, since that Q & A, I had always wondered why
you never even mentioned, no less acknowledged, that breakthrough in religious
freedom that you apparently realized on that day which came out of that 2 minute
Q & A. The answer to my perplexity is that you are still blind!
After all, Professor Rienzi, you had based your entire
legal defense argument beforehand in support of religious freedom for the
Little Sisters of the Poor on Sherbert
i.e. upon which the Restoration of Freedom of Religion Act [RFRA] is exclusively
based! However, after our Q & A you never changed your litigation strategy
on behalf of the Little Sisters of the Poor. Why not?
Again, RFRA is based on that above ruling in Sherbert as an allegedly valid declaration of facts and circumstances,
which I had proved to you as a matter of law in this Q & A was a fallacy.
Yet it was on Sept 13, 2012 at the Religious Freedom
Protect Symposium at Georgetown University, where I had first met you, that
prophetically I had called not only you, but the other 2 on Panel III and all
attorneys “blind” which words in my Q & A I included verbatim as follows:
Larry Rosano: “You mentioned before
that cooperation of evil is not something that you can say that’s a violation
of the religion [referring to both Moral Theologian and Law Professor Cathleen Kaveny
who said: ‘I’m raising the cooperation with evil argument, not as a legal
argument. I don’t think it has a basis in a (Constitution, added)
A4
at 1:05:26 -
1:05:44/1:39:07, added]. What about Mark 14:38. Jesus said ‘Don’t enter into
temptation. The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak’... the HHS mandate
is.. coercing a religious adherent to consent to an always available temptation
to violate religion in practice in order to be eligible for the other
nonoffensive to religion group health insurance benefits. .. That’s a First Amendment
right, period. It’s not a compelling state interest. You’re wrong. All three of
you are blind. Every lawyer is blind ...” [Panel III: Conflicts Between
Religious Freedom and Other Rights bet. 1:26:20–1:27:16/1:39:07]. For a further
explanation of the above read my
Letter To The Editor
[“LTE”] titled, UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE
[“UPS”] in Culture Wars Magazine [“CW”] May 2013 pp 8-10 at p 9 (paper ed), pp 10-13
at p 13 1st col. (electric ed); and on web at http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events/catholic-perspectives-on-religious-liberty
MY REFLECTIONS #2
Consequently, based exclusively
on her September 13, 2012 statement as articulated in the Panel III discussion
above, ironically, Moral
Theologian and Law Professor Cathleen Kaveny belied the fact that she is blind in the context that I had meant it i.e. by offering abortifacients,
abortion, contraception and sterilization coverage in group health insurance
[GHI] plans, twofold no less, precisely because: Firstly,
she never revealed the fact that what she considered above as “the cooperation with
evil argument, not as a legal argument. I don’t think it has a basis in a
(Constitution, added)”, Id., was again
a violation of the identical biblical verse from Mark 14:38 and Matthew 26:41,
namely, “Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation. The spirit is
willing but the flesh is weak.” Secondly,
violating again this identical verse from Mark 14:38 & Matthew 26:41 is in reality nothing more/less
than the government violating the free exercise of religion clause under our
federal first amendment by the government coercing a Roman Catholic to consent
to always available temptations to violate his/her religion in practice for the
exclusive purpose to file for and thereby become eligible to receive all
otherwise available non-offensive to religion GHI coverage in question, or else
be punished for not doing so, not only by a denial of some GHI plan to join,
but in addition to suffer financial fines that become a crime if not paid!
Less than a year after September 13, 2012 at a Religious Freedom Project at
Georgetown University, the moderator of the above Panel III, Thomas Banchoff, had
complimented me for my question in that Q & A at the end of Panel III where
I recited it above in my CW LTE May 2013, although he never pointed out the
legal significance that I did in my letters here attached.
Even
before 2004 when I had completed and copyrighted my book titled “HOW ABORTION
WILL BECOME UNCONSTITUTIONAL – The Complete Guide For Prolife Activists” I have
known this legal reasoning which indicates to me clearly as a matter of law
that you, the entire Roman Catholic Church and the legal profession I might add
are going in the wrong direction whereas I am uniquely and powerfully going in
the correct direction. In a nutshell, currently, you are a spearhead for
wasting time, money, resources and people’s efforts by blowing wind thereby
making you all WINDBAGS! Cf. John
9:39-41. However, I hope that will change soon!
Therefore, waiting for your reply I remain
EXHIBIT: UPS CW LTE May 2013 pp 8-10 Id. Yours in Christ,
cc. Tom Bancoff, Law Professor Marc DeGirolami ____________________________
File name: P-RIENZI-QA#7 Lawrence
R Rosano K of C #2228
A5
1 “[a] tax-exempt or
tax-deductible status is equivalent to a governmental subsidy”, Regan v. Taxation Without Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2000, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983).
3 This revelation
that Sherbert presupposed 3 burdens
on the free exercise of religion exists is precisely what I pointed out in my Culture Wars Magazine [CW]
Letter To Editor [LTE] titled, UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE, May 2013 (p 8 paper
ed.) (p 10-11 electric ed.) where also in that CW LTE I explained how group
health insurance [GHI] that includes religiously offensive but mandatory
coverage for abortion, contraception and sterilization not only prohibits the
free exercise of religion, which I had argued there on different grounds than I
did here, but, I argued that anti-life GHI as well respects an establishment of
religion i.e. utilitarianism - defined as “the idea that the moral worth of an action is solely determined by its contribution
to overall utility in maximizing happiness or pleasure” i.e. a form of the doctrine: the end justifies the means
- of which abortion, contraception and sterilization are practices thereof i.e.
each considered as a bona fide religious practice under 29 C.F.R. 1605.1 which
states this:
“In most cases whether or not a
practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in
which the issue does exist, the Commission (EEOC) will define religious
practices to include moral or ethical [emphasis, added] beliefs as to what
is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional
religious views. The standard was developed in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970) …. The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact
that the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not
accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief
of the employee or prospective employee.”
4 As a necessary background in order to understand the
powerful significance to this my breakthrough in religious freedom which had
been kept hidden from federal first amendment jurisprudence especially since
1963, on February 10, 2012 President Obama presented his accommodation to the
January 20th 2012 issued HHS mandate on behalf of His Imminence
Timothy Cardinal Dolan which accommodation I have articulated here in my own
words as follows: Consent to the federal government’s coercion upon, to include
all religiously offensive but mandatory anti-life coverage in all GHI plans
sponsored by, yet without the cost of the corresponding needed anti-life
portion of GHI plan premiums otherwise paid by, the Holy Roman Catholic Church
precisely because the only objection raised by His Imminence Timothy Cardinal
Dolan to President Obama on January 20, 2012 was the coercion upon, to pay for
such coverage in all anti-life GHI plans offered by, the Holy Roman Catholic
Church.
As a matter of fact on Feb. 10, 2012 after
Obama finished his above proposed accommodation in turn Cardinal Dolan remained
dumb thereby implying that either he had no other religious objections to doing
so at all or else he was unable to articulate in concrete terms both in
religion and/or in law how doing so was sinful or unlawful.
As a background in August 2011 I urged
Cardinal Dolan to read my papers which explained in detail my definition of the
burden on the free exercise of religion. However, he refused to read my papers
because he objected to the tone of my letter without pointing out what I had
stated was offensive in tone and how I did so in my letter.
Now frustrated with my Bishop, William
Murphy, and Cardinal Dolan both of whom refused to read my papers, in turn, on
December 8, 2011 I expressed-mailed then His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI my
papers who on January19, 2012 prophetically met with the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops e.g. Cardinal Dolan - just as I had asked him to do – in order
to educate Cardinal Dolan on how to challenge anti-life GHI which I learned
since 1979 when I began to develop how to do so on my behalf. On January 20, 2012 Cardinal Dolan did so however he did
not do so addressing the February 10, 2012 proposed accommodation. Had I been
his advisor I would have raised that the February 10, 2012 accommodation
violates Matthew 26:41 & Mark 14:38 as religiously offensive and violates
the free exercise of religion clause acc. to my definition of a burden on the
free exercise of religion, above, as well!
Conclusively Cardinal Dolan and Bishop
Murphy were blind to Matthew 26:41 and Mark 14:38 thereby deficient in the
performance of their duties as Cardinal and Bishop to defend the Christian
Faith and moreover committing culpable ignorance for ignoring to discuss with
me, no less read, my papers e.g. my definition above. But not only is the Holy
Roman Catholic Clergy blind to the Christian Faith as specifically proven above
but all lawyers e.g. Law Professor Rienzi below
are similarly situated as well, yet as far as the law is concerned; although
St. Thomas Aquinas in his THE SUMMA
THEOLOGICA Qu. 17 Art. 3 stated under ¶A (page 2) again, as follows: “Everyone who is deceived, understands
not that in which he is deceived.” For
example, consider that in my CW LTE May 2013, as mentioned, above, I also
included a Q [question] & A [answer] within a symposium held on Sept. 13,
2012 at Georgetown University where at Panel III I called Law Professor Mark
Rienzi and 2 other law professors “blind” memorialized at http://berkleycenter.
georgetown.edu/events/catholicperspectives-on-religious-liberty as
follows:
Larry Rosano: “You mentioned before
that cooperation of evil is not something that you can say that’s a violation
of the religion - [referring to both Moral Theologian and Law Professor
Cathleen Kaveny: “I’m raising the cooperation with evil argument, not as a
legal argument. I don’t think it has a basis in a (Constitution, added)” at
1:05:26 - 1:05:44/1:39:07, added] -. What about Mark 14:38. ‘Jesus said “Don’t
enter into temptation. The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak”’...the HHS
mandate is … coercing a religious adherent to consent to an always available
temptation to violate religion in practice in order to be eligible for the
other non-offensive to religion group health insurance benefits. ... That’s a
First Amendment right, period. It’s not a compelling state interest. You’re wrong. All three of you are blind.
Every lawyer is blind” e.g. belying Prof. Kaveny above is blind! [bet. 1:26:20–1:27:16/1:39:07].
Note the K of C and Priests For Life,
including even Cardinal Dolan in August 2011, refused to read my papers. Thus,
as my last resort on Dec. 8, 2011 by mail I asked the Holy Father to do so,
which he did on Jan. 19, 2012, but he left out my above arguments which would
have overcame Obama’s Feb. 10, 2012 concession as well had I been Cardinal
Dolan’s advisor. Also, all Prolife class complainants under Rosano v. U.S., 9
Cl.Ct.
137 (1985) are de facto conscientious objectors [“C.O.”].
This C.O. status is defined as Pro-lifers who are 1) opposed to the “War on the
Unborn” i.e. “war in any form,” 2) as their belief is sincere, 3) based on
religious training and belief, Taylor v.
Claytor, 601 F.2d 1102,1103 (9th Cir. 1978). So even before
abortion is held unlawful “The truth of a belief is not open to question,
rather, the question is whether the objector’s beliefs are truly held”, United States v. Lynch, 952 F.Supp. 167,
169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Once a C.O. successfully raises a prima facie claim then
the burden falls upon the U.S. (e.g. now President Trump, added]) to show why
the C.O. was denied C.O. status considering e.g. in
1979 Judge Greene held [i] that
abortion is not related to the health of a
woman; yet to the contrary [ii] denying tax-exempt or tax-deductible status for
abortion would discriminate against
religions opposed to Catholicism! Thus, all Pro-lifers are still entitled
to a C.O. status.”
5 The Restoration of Freedom of Religion Act of 1993 (hereinafter known as “RFRA”) enacted in law as 42 U.S.C. §2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of purposes (a) Findings
The Congress finds
that—
(1)
the framers of the Constitution, recognizing
free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in
the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2)
laws "neutral" toward religion may
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise;
(3)
governments should not substantially burden
religious exercise without compelling justification;
(4)
in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion;
and
(5)
the compelling interest test as set forth in
prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are—
(1)
to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) [emphasis, added] and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and
(2)
to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.
REFERENCES IN TEXT
This chapter, referred to in subsec.
(b), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 103–141, Nov. 16,
1993, 107 Stat. 1488,
which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of
this Act to the Code, see Short Title note below and Tables.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
For constitutionality of section 2 of
Pub. L. 103–141, see Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of the
United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, Appendix 1, Acts of
Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
SHORT TITLE
Pub. L. 103–141, §1, Nov. 16,
1993, 107 Stat. 1488, provided that: "This Act [enacting this
chapter and amending section 1988 of this title and section 504 of Title 5,
Government Organization and Employees] may be cited as the 'Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993'."
EX. ORD. NO. 13798. PROMOTING FREE SPEECH AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY Ex. Ord. No. 13798, May 4, 2017, 82 F.R. 21675,
provided:
By the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in
order to guide the executive branch in formulating and implementing policies
with implications for the religious liberty of persons and organizations in
America, and to further compliance with the Constitution and with applicable
statutes and Presidential Directives, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. It shall be the policy of the executive branch to
vigorously enforce Federal law's robust protections for religious freedom. The
Founders envisioned a Nation in which religious voices and views were integral
to a vibrant public square, and in which religious people and institutions were
free to practice their faith without fear of discrimination or retaliation by
the Federal Government. For that reason, the U.S. Constitution enshrines and
protects the fundamental right to religious liberty as Americans' first
freedom. Federal law protects the freedom of Americans and their organizations
to exercise religion and participate fully in civic life without undue
interference by the Federal Government. The executive branch will honor and
enforce those protections.
Sec. 2. Respecting Religious and Political Speech. All executive departments
and agencies (agencies) shall, to the greatest extent practicable and to the
extent permitted by law, respect and protect the freedom of persons and
organizations to engage in religious and political speech. In particular, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure, to the extent permitted by law, that
the Department of the Treasury does not take any adverse action against any
individual, house of worship, or other religious organization on the basis that
such individual or organization speaks or has spoken about moral or political
issues from a religious perspective, where speech of similar character has,
consistent with law, not ordinarily been treated as participation or
intervention in a political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) a candidate
for public office by the Department of the Treasury. As used in this section,
the term "adverse action" means the imposition of any tax or tax
penalty; the delay or denial of tax-exempt status; the disallowance of tax
deductions for contributions made to entities exempted from taxation under
section 501(c)(3) of title 26, United States Code; or any other action that
makes unavailable or denies any tax deduction, exemption, credit, or benefit.
Sec. 3. Conscience Protections with Respect to Preventive-Care Mandate. The
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Health
and Human Services shall consider issuing amended regulations, consistent with
applicable law, to address conscience-based objections to the preventive-care
mandate promulgated under section 300gg–13(a)(4) of title 42, United States
Code.
Sec. 4. Religious Liberty Guidance. In order to guide all agencies in
complying with relevant Federal law, the Attorney General shall, as
appropriate, issue guidance interpreting religious liberty protections in
Federal law.
Sec. 5. Severability. If any provision of this order, or the application of
any provision to any individual or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the
remainder of this order and the application of its other provisions to any
other individuals or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 6. General
Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or
otherwise affect:
(i)
the authority granted by law to an executive
department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii)
the functions of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative
proposals.
(b)
This order shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c)
This order is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or
in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or
entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
DONALD J. TRUMP.
§2000bb–1. Free exercise of religion protected (a)
In general
Government shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person—
(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has
been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim
or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the
Constitution.
§2000bb–2.
Definitions
As used in this chapter—
(1) the
term "government" includes a branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of
the United States, or of a covered entity;
(2) the
term "covered entity" means the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and possession of the United
States;
(3) the
term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of going forward with the
evidence and of persuasion; and
(4) the
term "exercise of religion" means religious exercise, as defined in
section 2000cc–5 of this title.
(Pub. L. 103–141, §5, Nov. 16,
1993, 107 Stat. 1489; Pub. L. 106–274, §7(a), Sept.
22, 2000, 114 Stat. 806.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
This chapter, referred to in text, was
in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 103–141, Nov. 16,
1993, 107 Stat. 1488, which
is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this
Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2000bb of this
title and Tables.
AMENDMENTS
2000—Par. (1).
Pub. L. 106–274, §7(a)(1), substituted "or of a covered entity" for
"a State, or a subdivision of a State".
Par. (2). Pub. L. 106–274, §7(a)(2), substituted "term
'covered entity' means" for "term 'State' includes".
Par. (4). Pub. L. 106–274, §7(a)(3),
substituted "religious exercise, as defined in section 2000cc–5 of this
title" for "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
Constitution".
§2000bb–3. Applicability (a) In general
This chapter applies to all Federal
law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993.
(b) Rule of construction
Federal statutory law adopted after
November 16, 1993, is subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly
excludes such application by reference to this chapter.
(c) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any
government to burden any religious belief.
(Pub. L. 103–141, §6, Nov. 16,
1993, 107 Stat. 1489; Pub. L. 106–274, §7(b), Sept.
22, 2000, 114 Stat. 806.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
This chapter, referred to in text, was
in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 103–141, Nov. 16,
1993, 107 Stat. 1488,
which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of
this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2000bb of this
title and Tables.
AMENDMENTS
2000—Subsec.
(a). Pub. L. 106–274 struck out "and State" after
"Federal".
§2000bb–4.
Establishment clause unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect,
interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First
Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of
religion (referred to in this section as the
"Establishment Clause"). Granting government
funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the
Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of
this chapter. As used in this section, the term "granting",
used with respect to government funding, benefits, or
exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or
exemptions.
REFERENCES IN TEXT
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original
"this Act", meaning Pub. L. 103–141, Nov. 16,
1993, 107
Stat. 1488,
which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of
this Act to the Code, see
Short Title note set out under section 2000bb of this
title and Tables
6 Yet
to the contrary on Nov. 18, 1974 in his Declaration
on Procured Abortion at ¶#22 His Holiness Saint Pope Paul VI declared: “It must be clearly
understood that a Christian can never conform to a law, which would admit in principle
the liceity of abortion [emphasis, added]. Nor can a Christian take part in
a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it. Moreover, he may
not collaborate in its application” that makes
it still intrinsically evil!
7 This
statement of facts was verified by Law Professor Mark L. Rienzi on Sept. 18,
2015 at our Q & A here at exhibits A3-5.
8
The
Summa Theologica by St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. 17, Art. 3. Whether falsity is in the intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in
the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq.
lxxxiii, 32), Everyone
“who is deceived,
understands not that in which he is deceived [emphasis, added].” But
falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein.
Therefore, falsity does not exist in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is
no falsity in the intellect. On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,
22 that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth
and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth
and falsehood exist in the intellect.
I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form [emphasis, added], but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form [emphasis, added], or accidental thereto. For it has been said (Article 2) that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it [emphasis, added]. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (Question 16, Article 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above (Art 2).
But because
falsity of the intellect is concerned
essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also
accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of
a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing
the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the
definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by composing a
definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is
not only false of the thing, but false in itself [emphasis, added]. A
definition such as "a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this
kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable
animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect
cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or
it understands nothing at all.
Reply
to Objection 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the
intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its
essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which
there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's
words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that
wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived
in any operation of the intellect [emphasis, added].
Reply to
Objection 2: The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since
it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about
what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the
terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the
definition of the subject.
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